that it’s been in these so called standard agreements for a long time. Big companies and small companies use them in New England and other states too.
WR: By removing the requirement, do you think that’s enough to prompt your portfolio companies to end the practice? What about cases where there are other investors that do still have the requirement?
Bijan: We are going to encourage our companies to drop the non-compete clause. Many of them already do not include them—certainly the ones in California. In cases where we have co-investors we will do our best to encourage them to drop the non-compete clause. That is the best we can do right now.
WR: What are the biggest problems with non-compete agreements, from your point of view, and how could doing away with them help with innovation and economic growth in Massachusetts and New England?
Bijan: I wrote a blog post about this. It’s a big deal in my view. One way to consider this point is by looking at California. If you look at California, there are a lot of startups created from alumni of successful and unsuccessful companies. Many of these entrepreneurs came from companies that we would call competitors to their new thing. How many people are at Google that used to work at Yahoo? How many folks are at Apple that used to work at Microsoft? Where did the earliest Apple employees come from? How about founders of Intel?
Non-competes in the state of Massachusetts means that our startups have one arm tied behind their back. Massachusetts entrepreneurs can’t leave and start any company they want. They can’t just think about changing the world. They have to think about possible legal risks. This is a real barrier and obstacle.
WR: Do you have any specific examples in mind where non-compete agreements prevented something cool from developing?
Bijan: Absolutely. Often when a large company buys a startup—[which is] very typical in the state of Massachusetts—the acquisition may or may not work. Often the entrepreneur still loves the market or vision that they originally pursued. So now after a suboptimal acquisition, what should those employees do? Stay at the new company that isn’t executing? Leave and do something completely different? Or should they use all of their intelligence, creativity, and ambition and try to build something new and big?
WR: Can you describe the discussion you had within Spark leading up to this decision? Was it seen as a “no-brainer,” or was there some serious discussion of the pros and cons? What were they, both for Spark and for your portfolio companies?
Bijan: I certainly discussed it with my partners quite a bit. We felt strongly about this but we wanted to talk to some folks as well before making this a firm decision. We spoke to several legal experts and we talked to some very successful local entrepreneurs. With all of this in mind, we felt determined to move ahead.
WR: Non-compete clauses are often a standard part of existing contracts for new employees or contractors. It will take a while for the lawyers to rewrite all those contracts. Meanwhile, what would you encourage employees/employers to do—simply cross out those sections before they sign contracts?
Bijan: Yes. Cross them out.
WR: Have you talked with a lot of other VC folks who share your view? Are you optimistic that other New England venture firms will follow Spark’s example?
Bijan: I’ve talked to some individual VCs that agree but they need to spend some more time talking to their entire partnership. Some other VCs may take a longer to support this either publicly or privately. And so I didn’t want to wait to get consensus with other investors before we put a stake in the ground.
Ultimately I’m very optimistic. It’s the right thing to do for everyone. It will create new ideas, foster innovation and create new companies…all on a level playing field. It will help large companies stay focused. It will help VCs. It will help entrepreneurs.
I hope that other VCs, founders and CEOs support this effort. It’s time to think long term about these things.
